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Almost fifteen years have passed since Stanley Weinstein decried the neglect of 
the Tendai tradition by Western scholars in his review article on Hakeda’s 
book on Kukai.1 A number of publications in the last few years have rectified 
this situation somewhat.2 These recent publications are best illustrated by 
Groner’s pioneering work on SaichO, the founder of the Japanese Tendai 
school.
1 See “The beginnings of esoteric Buddhism in Japan: The neglected Tendai tradi­
tion,” in Journal of Asian Studies XXXIV/1 (November 1974), pp. 177-191.
2 See David W. Chappell, ed., T'ien-t’ai Buddhism: An Outline of the Fourfold 
Teachings, Tokyo: Daiichi-ShobO, 1983 (reviewed in The Eastern Buddhist XVII/2, 
pp. 142-144, 1984), and the special issue on Tendai Buddhism in Japan in the Japanese 
Journal of Religious Studies 14/2-3, 1987, which contains a comprehensive biblio­
graphy on the subject.
Groner’s book on SaichO concentrates on the role of the precepts in the 
establishment of the Tendai school in early Heian Japan, but also provides a 
short opening chapter on Buddhism during the late Nara period and a substan­
tial biography of SaichO, which takes up almost half the book. The 
biographical account methodically examines the life and times of SaichO, 
from his early life, the years on Mt. Hiei, his voyage to China and return to 
Japan, his relations with Kukai, and his struggles to establish the Tendai 
school. It contains accurate annotated translations and discussions of impor­
tant works such as the Ganmon (Vows, pp. 28-30), RokujOshiki (Regulations 
in six articles, pp. 116-123), and various petitions to the court (pp. 126-156). 
Groner meticulously presents the various aspects of SaichO’s life and work, 
revealing an extensive knowledge of primary sources and a thorough familiari­
ty with recent Japanese scholarship. On controversial points such as uncertain 
dates (pp. 19-21), the deterioration of relations with Kukai (pp. 83-87), and 
the interpretation of the famous phrase “he who sheds his light over a corner
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of the country” (shOu ichigu, pp. 116-117), Groner carefully presents a wide 
array of opinion, scrupulously avoiding reckless or biased conclusions. One 
can read this account with the assurance that no important source or inter­
pretation has been ignored.
That is not to say that Groner’s work covers everything there is to write 
about SaichO and early Tendai Buddhism. The topic is too vast for a single 
book, and Groner wisely concentrates on one aspect: the precepts and their 
role in the establishment of the Japanese Tendai school. The “precepts” in 
this context refer to the Ssu fen liij the vinaya followed by most temples in 
Nara and the rest of Japan in SaichO’s time, and the Fan wang (bodhisattva, 
or “perfect”) precepts,3 4 5which SaichO wanted to establish. In Part Two 
Groner again details meticulously the role of the precepts in SaichO’s thought, 
the provisional Hlnay&na ordination, SaichO’s sources for the perfect precepts 
(including Chinese commentaries on the bodhisattva precepts), the influences 
on SaichO’s view of the precepts, and the integration of the various strands of 
Japanese Tendai. Finally, in Part Three, Groner examines the effects of 
SaichO’s reforms during the Heian period, and by extension their influence on 
Japanese Buddhism as a whole. This shift from the Ssu fen lu precepts to the 
more general bodhisattva precepts marks an important turning point in the 
development of Japanese Buddhism, and we are indebted to Groner for his 
diligent assessment of the subject.
3 The Dharmaguptavinaya, T. 22, #1428, 567-1014.
4 Based on the Fan wang ching, T. 24, #1484,997-1010, to be distinguished from the 
Brahma jala-sQtra (T. 1, #21, 264-270) of the Agamas.
5 See Tokiwa DaijO, BusshO no kenkyll, reprint. Tokyo: Kokusho KankOkai, 1972, 
pp. 25-27.
As mentioned above, many important topics concerning SaichO and the Ten­
dai school remain unexamined. The most important doctrinal issue is the con­
troversy surrounding Buddha nature, represented in the long-running debate 
between Tokuitsu (who supported the HossO doctrine of the five different 
gotras, or natures, of human beings) and SaichO (who supported the ekayona 
principle of universal Buddha nature). Groner gives an adequate summary of 
this important debate (pp. 91-106), but it remains a topic requiring a full 
book-length study. As Tokiwa DaijO emphasized in his classic study of the 
development of the Buddha nature doctrine, at no other time in the history of 
Buddhist thought was this topic so thoroughly analyzed.3 Do all beings 
possess the potential for attaining enlightenment and becoming a Buddha (a 
position which developed into the hongaku, or “inherent enlightenment,” 
concept which dominates Japanese Buddhism); or do beings have different
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natures and potentials, with some forever cut off from the possibility of Bud- 
dhahood?
An issue that remains unresolved is the capability of Tokuitsu himself and 
his presentation of the HossG/YogScAra position. It is generally agreed that 
SaichO “won” the debate, and the subsequent development of Japanese Bud­
dhism in which the Buddha nature concept became an almost undisputed 
assumption leads one to easily accept this conclusion. However, there are 
grounds for believing that Tokuitsu was a competent but not brilliant 
scholar,6 and I suspect that scholars of a Yogacar a bent, if familiar with 
Tokuitsu’s work, would not be satisfied with his defense of their position. Re­
cent work by Hakamaya Noriaki of a semi-sensational nature, arguing 
vehemently against the “orthodoxy” of the Buddha nature/Aongafa// 
tathagata-garbha tradition, reveals that this stance has not died out in Japan.7 8
To discuss this subject is to cut to the core of Buddhist doctrine. What is the 
meaning of pratTtya-samutpada and tonyata?* What is the correct under­
standing of non-duality (such as taught in the VimalakTrti-nirdefa SQtra) and 
is it compatible with other purported teachings of the Buddha? How can one 
justify the concept of the Buddha nature, or tathdgata-garbha, or the univer­
sality of the potential to attain Buddhahood, theoretically with regard to the 
doctrine of anOtman, or practically when faced with the prevalence of ig­
norance, greed, avarice, and delusion in the world today? SaichG may have 
won the battle, but the issue remains unresolved.
6 Japanese scholars (including Tokiwa DaijO) have usually considered Tokuitsu a 
very competent scholar, but some have raised questions concerning his scholarship. 
See, for example, the article “Tokuitsu kyOgaku e no gigi“ in Indogaku BukkyOgaku 
KenkyQ XXV/2, 1977, pp. 680-681. See also the full compilation of articles and source 
material on Tokuitsu edited and published recently by Tamura Kdytl, Tokuitsu ronsO, 
Tokyo: Kokusho KankOkai, 1986.
7 See, for example, the articles “Kyoto gakuha hihan" (Critique of the Kyoto 
school) in Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogakubu ronshQ 17, October 1986, pp. 413-436; 
YuimakyO hihan (Critique of the VimalakTrti sQtra), Indogaku BukkyOgaku KenkyQ 
36/1, December 1987, pp. 10-16.
8 The recent work by David J. Kalupahana on Nagarjuna and his controversial 
claim that Nagarjuna was not a MahSyinist is not unrelated to this topic. See NQgOr- 
juna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way, Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1986.
The Buddha nature issue is just one of many topics surrounding SaichG and 
the early Tendai school which remain to be studied and clarified. It bears 
repeating, however, that Groner’s study is a pioneering effort in this area and
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deserves to join the small but growing number of works that should grace the 
bookshelves of those interested in Japanese Buddhism.
Paul L. Swanson
RATIONALITY AND MIND IN EARLY BUDDHISM. By Frank J. 
Hoffman. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987. xii + 128 pages, notes, 
bibliography, index. ISBN 81-208-0211-X
Professor Hoffman's work is, he says, one that operates at the interface be­
tween philosophy of religion and buddhology, taking as its raw material the 
Buddhism of the Pali Nikoyas. By this he means that he wants to gain “sym­
pathetic understanding of what is internally coherent and linguistically precise 
in the language of the . . . texts studied” and to pay “attention to Asian 
thought from a critical philosophical point of view” (p. 7). Certainly, the 
main thrust of the book is philosophical: it is perhaps best understood as an 
application to early Buddhism of some of the methodologies and substantive 
conclusions developed by anglophone philosophers of religion since about 
1930.
Hoffman treats a somewhat miscellaneous collection of issues, including: 
terms for and ideas about the mental; the thesis that early Buddhism is a kind 
of empiricism; problems involved with anattO and rebirth; and problems in­
volved with describing nibbona as the “deathless” (amata). In the first three 
chapters (pp. 1-45) he deals with methodological issues, theses that, if taken se­
riously, would make his approach ineffective or inappropriate. He first rejects 
the thesis that it is improper to restrict attention to the Pali NikOyas without 
considering the later exegetical and commentarial tradition, and stresses 
(quite properly) that one can understand the NikOyas as a self-sufficient body 
of literature
He then considers whether the Buddhism of the NikOyas is unintelligible in 
virtue of systematic offences against the ‘principle of contradiction*. Hoffman 
nowhere makes quite clear what he intends by this principle; some remarks 
suggest that he intends to include the principle of excluded middle, others that 
he does not. But his main point is that the apparent contravention of this basic 
logical principle (a principle that is at least a condition upon all meaningful 
discourse) in the third and fourth lemmas of the tetralemma used so frequent­
ly in Buddhist texts, is not in fact a contravention at all. This is because logic is
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